SYMPOSIUM
Limitations on the Effectiveness of Criminal Defense
Counsel: Legitimate Means or "Chilling Wedges?"
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Recent experience has required more aggressive prosecution of society's fight against the mounting evils of crime.
We commend both vigorous prosecution and all legitimate
means in aid of this laudable task. This, however, does not
mean that society can afford a "no holds barred" approach
to law enfbrcement lest the "solution" engender faults of an
equally serious nature.'
A lawyer owes ethical obligations not only to the lawyer's client,
but also, as an officer of the court with a duty to uphold the Constitution, to the legal system. These ethical obligations are especially urgent
in the area of criminal law, where the liberty and perhaps the life of
the defendant are at stake as well as the vindication of the victim's
rights. In this situation, when emotions run high on both sides, the
prosecutor and defense counsel can easily cross the line between ethical
and unethical conduct in an attempt to "win at all costs"- never mind
whether justice is served. This Symposium examines some of the ethical
dilemmas that defense counsel may encounter.
f Senior Fellow in Law and Director of the Center on Professionalism, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1942, Harvard College; LL.B. 1948, Harvard University.
Judge Spaeth served as the President Judge of the Pennsylvania Superior Court from
1983 to 1986.
1 United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 658 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated, United
States v. Klubock, No. 86-1413 (1st Cir. May 1, 1987) (order granting rehearing en
banc,- which withdrew the panel's opinion and vacated its judgment); see also United
States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 665 (en banc) (Torruella, C.J.) (stating that the half
of the en banc panel voting to affirm the district court also "abide[d] by the majority
panel opinion").
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The Symposium reprinted below was held on March 1, 1988, at
the University of Pennsylvania. It was sponsored by the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, the Center on Professionalism at the Law
School, and the Law School Council of Student Representatives. Support for the Symposium was also provided by the Law School's Alumni
Society. The Symposium offered an exchange between private practitioners, government attorneys, and academics.
Section one addresses the issue of when the government may subpoena defense counsel to testify before a grand jury. The prosecutor
typically will be seeking information pertaining to client identity, fees,
or future criminal activity of the client. The danger of subpoenaing
defense counsel is that it "drives a chilling wedge" between counsel and
client. This is so not simply because the rules of professional conduct
discourage, 2 and sometimes prohibit, 3 an attorney in a case from being
a witness in that case, but also because of its deleterious impact on the
attorney-client relationship, especially the client's willingness to communicate with the attorney.
Section two concerns investigating criminal defense counsel suspected of criminal wrongdoing. Everyone agrees that attorneys engaged
in criminal conduct should be investigated and prosecuted, but overzealous investigation, employing modern crime detection techniques such as
electronic surveillance, may intrude into the zone of a legitimate attorney-client relationship. There must be reasonable and adequate safeguards on investigatory techniques that balance the conflicting concerns
of ensuring the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship while permitting the prosecution of unethical attorneys.
Section three considers the effect of Nix v. Whiteside4 on the criminal defense practice. The papers examine the implications of perjurious testimony by criminal defendants on counsel's ability to present a
zealous defense. Specifically, the issues discussed are: (1) how much
knowledge must the attorney have before acting on the conclusion that
the client's testimony will be perjurious; and (2) what should the attorney do in anticipation of client perjury or when the client commits
perjury?

Finally, section four considers how various limitations on defense
5
counsel may affect the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.
2

See

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 3.7 (1987);

MODEL

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(b) (1980) id. DR 5-102.
1 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1987); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(b) (1980) id. DR 5-102.

4 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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The papers discuss the scope of the right and the impact of the federal
fee forfeiture statute,' which requires defense counsel to forfeit any fee
that came from the proceeds of a criminal enterprise.
In sum, the papers that follow are a significant contribution to the
field of legal ethics. They recognize the importance of the attorneyclient relationship as one of the cornerstones of our criminal justice system, while at the same time acknowledging the necessity of some limitations on the activities of defense counsel. How to achieve a proper
balance of these conflicting concerns is the common theme of the debate
that follows.
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Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 303-309, 98 Stat. 1837, 2044-53 (1984).

